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required by the statute. One can only express wonder at Mrs.
Scott's prodigious persistence.
Security Devices
Those furnishing labor, services, or supplies in connection
with the drilling or operation of oil, gas, and water wells are
granted a privilege on production, wells, leases, and equipment
to secure their claims.49 A prescriptive period of one year is specified but is interrupted if suit is brought. 50 It is further provided
that a creditor whose claim is secured by the privilege may"
enforce it by writ of sequestration without bond. 51
Plaintiff in Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools v. Carthay
Land Co. 52 claimed that certain other lien holders had failed to
protect their claims by filing suit within the prescriptive period
as required by the statute. It appeared that the other claimants
had proceeded by personal action against the debtor and had not
utilized the writ of sequestration. Plaintiff urged that use of the
writ was the only method by which a lienholder could proceed
in accordance with the statute.
The court of appeal distinguished other cases in which it was
held that the claimant could have only an in rem action because
in those instances there was no personal jurisdiction over the
debtor.53 In this case, however, personal jurisdiction had been
obtained, and the other claimants were not required to proceed
by writ of sequestration to preserve their claims.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Problems concerning the interpretation and application of
insurance policies and the laws relating thereto continue to claim
a considerable amount of judicial attention. They usually present
only factual issues calling for resolution under established rules.
The following comments cover a limited number of cases meriting special notice.
49. LA. R.S. 9:4861-4867 (1950).
50. LA. R.S. 9:4865 (1950).
51. LA. R.S. 9:4866 (1950).
52. 212 So.2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
53. Rhodes v. Chrysanthou, 191 La. 774, 186 So. 333 (1939); Blankenship v. Stovall, 159 So. 477 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); Young v. Reed, 157
So. 809 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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A decision both interesting and instructive was rendered by
the Supreme Court in Shaw v. New York Fire & Marine Underwriters, Inc.1 The case involved a direct action by an injured
guest passenger against two automobile liability insurers. The
resulting judgment gave rise to claims of contribution by the
insurers against each other. The court of appeal had affirmed a
judgment in favor of the injured plaintiff against Liberty Mutual,
the liability insurer of one of the joint tortfeasors, for $10,000.00,
the limit of its policy, and against New York Fire, the insurer
of the other, for $5,000.00, its policy limit. A writ was granted
for the sole purpose of considering the claim of Liberty Mutual
that judgment should have been rendered against both insurers
in solido in the amount of $5,000.00, the limit of liability under
the New York Fire policy, plus an award of an additional amount
of $5,000.00 against it, thus entitling it to contribution against
New York Fire in the amount of $2,500.00, and the opposing claim
of New York Fire that it was entitled to contribution against
Liberty Mutual for one-half of the $5,000.00 judgment against
it. These claims were rejected. It was pointed out that the policy
limits of each insurer had to be taken into account to avoid fragmentizing the obligations of the insurers to the prejudice of the
injured plaintiff. It is clear that if plaintiff's suit had been brought
against the joint tortfeasors instead of their insurers, the $15,000.00 judgment would have been rendered against them in solido
and each on paying the whole amount of the judgment would
have been entitled to contribution from the other. However, because of the policy limits, the plaintiff under such a judgment
could have collected $10,000.00 against Liberty Mutual, but only
$5,000.00 against New York Fire. Of course, both would have
been bound in solido to satisfy plaintiff's judgment but only subject to the policy limits. Neither insurer would have any claim
against the other beyond these limits,' nor could any claim in
contribution be allowed to prejudice the plaintiff. It is true that
because of the policy limits Liberty Mutual had to pay twice as
much as New York Fire, but if Liberty Mutual should have any
claim at all, it would have to be asserted properly against New
York Fire's insured.
Very good discussions of the responsibility of a liability insurer with respect to settlement of claims are contained in the
majority and dissenting opinions rendered in the case of Trahan
1. 252 La. 653, 212 So.2d 416 (1968).
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v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. 2 On the advice of local counsel, the insurer had refused a settlement of all claims at a figure well within
the policy limits. Questions of coverage and liability, neither of
which was insubstantial, were involved. An adverse judgment,
however, resulted in the insured's having to pay $25,000.00, for
which amount he brought suit against his insurer. Although the
majority opinion found no bad faith on the part of the insurer
sufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees it did find that
in refusing to settle, the insurer improperly placed its own interest above that of the insured. The delicacy of the insurer's
position in this kind of situation is well reflected by the facts of
the case. In view of the fact that conflicting statements made by
the insured had a direct bearing on the position taken by the
insurer, the former can be counted as fortunate.
A related problem considered by the court of appeal in
Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. 8 will be considered by the Supreme Court, but only with respect to assignment
of error number 1. The question presented, which is res nova in
this state, concerns the freedom of an insurer to make good faith
settlements with some of multiple claimants even though the
insurance proceeds are exhausted to the prejudice of the others.
In holding in favor of the insurer, the court of appeal observed
that any other view would force the insurer to institute concursus
proceedings and thus compel litigation by all claimants in violation of the policy of the law to favor compromises. The opinion
of the Supreme Court will be of interest.
In Miller v. Marcantel,4 a delay of five months occurred in
giving the insurer notice of the filing of suit against an omnibus
insured and his employer, the named insured. Finding no prejudice to the insurer by the delay, the court held against it on a
third party demand. Two cases from another circuit, on which
the trial court relied, were distinguished. The court's conclusion
was that the real test for determining whether the insurer is
exonerated in such a case is whether the failure to give notice,
either of the occurrence of the accident or of the filing of suit, is
prejudicial. The holding was supported by reference to the
opinion of the Supreme Court in West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc.,5
2. 219 So.2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
3. 212 So.2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). For the affirming opinion of the
supreme court, handed down subsequent to this comment, see Richard v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 223 So.2d 858 (La. 1969).
4. 221 So.2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
5. 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122 (1950).
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which involved a failure to give notice of an accident, and
Howard v. Early Chevrolet-Pontiac-Cadillac,Inc.," which involved a like failure but also included a claim by the insured
against his own insurer. The decision in West was that the rights
of a claimant become fixed at the time of the accident. Left open
was the question of whether an insurer cast in judgment in favor
of a claimant notwithstanding a failure to give notice might have
a claim over against its insured. The instant decision indicates
that this issue must be resolved by determining whether the
insured's conduct was prejudicial to the insurer. This resolution
is consistent with the treatment generally accorded representations, warranties, and conditions by statute and court decision.
The good faith insured is protected against non-prejudicial violations of policy provisions.
A decision which seems to be clearly in keeping with the
spirit of the law was rendered in the case of Gray & Co. v. Stiles.7
Therein it was held that a policy of automobile liability insurance
issued by a surplus line company was legal evidence of financial
responsibility within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Law although some ambiguity was found to exist
in the applicable provisions of the mentioned law and the provisions of the Insurance Code. A contrary decision would have
imposed a hardship which the court felt the legislature could
not have intended on a motorist compelled to procure surplus
line coverage because of his inability to get protection from an
authorized insurer.

PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin*
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

In Guillory v. State Dep't of InstitutioiT, 1 the First Circuit
had occasion to examine the rulemaking powers and procedures
of the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the Civil Service Commission. Under the statute the superintendent of the penitentiary
6. 150 So.2d
7. 221 So.2d
* Professor
1. 219 So.2d

309 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
832 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
of Law, Louisiana State University
282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).

